

CHAPTER 4

THE ‘PACIFICATION’ OF TUHOE, 1868–72

4.1 Introduction

The narrative of this chapter resumes at the end of 1867, at a point where the Tuhoe tribe were greatly disillusioned owing to their unsuccessful attempts to regain their confiscated territories in the Compensation Court. What follows is a description of the Tuhoe resistance to confiscation and to Government authority, with a focus on the actions of the chief Tamaikoha, and an explanation of how this resistance found expression in Tuhoe’s support for the visionary leader Te Kooti. The consequences of this widespread support were to be dramatic, and Tuhoe found themselves at war with a Government that was under great pressure from an outraged settler population to bring Te Kooti to justice and to bring Tuhoe within the pale of the law. The Government invasions of the Urewera district were a harsh, drawn-out, and expensive undertaking. By 1871, both Tuhoe and the Government were exhausted and McLean’s efforts were redirected at trying to ‘pacify’ the Tuhoe tribe. It seems that the means by which this was achieved was a promise to acknowledge the regional autonomy of Urewera and the authority of each chief within his own district. Tuhoe’s accord with McLean is examined, then, since this understanding was the touchstone of subsequent Tuhoe claims to hold the mana and authority over their land and people.

The Crown invasions of the Urewera are canvassed in this report because the Waitangi Tribunal is interested not only in the loss of claimants’ land and resources, but in the nature and quality of the Crown’s relationship with Tuhoe. The fact that the Crown and Tuhoe were at war in 1868–71 is a very serious matter that warrants further investigation.

4.2 The Aftermath of Confiscation

The dismissal of Tuhoe’s claims in the Compensation Court left the Tuhoe divided over what, if any, course of action they should take to regain their confiscated lands.

Te Makarini and his people returned to Puketi Pa in Opouriao. His intention, according to Milroy, was ‘to prevent further incursions into Tuhoe territory by both the military and the settlers’.¹ He was, then, demonstrating his ownership of the

1. W Milroy, ‘Tamarau Waiari’, in *1870–1900*, vol 2 of *The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography*, C Orange (ed), Wellington, Bridget Williams Books Ltd and Department of Internal Affairs, 1993, p 500

land by returning. However, Te Makarini and other Tuhoe chiefs were removed from Puketi and forcibly detained for a period in Whakatane. St John reported:

Mr Clarke has removed down to Whakatane itself the so-called friendly Natives (Uriweras) who, under Makarini (McLean), had abandoned Ruatoki and Utenuku and come down to Puketi (junction of the Waimana and Whakatane Rivers).²

According to Melbourne, Clarke's actions signalled the end to any Tuhoe cooperation with the authorities.³ As Ngati Pukeko had warned, the Tuhoe who had been living at Pa Harehare, Kai Matahi, and Hatupere in Opouriao were forced to move behind the conâscation line to their kin at Otenuku, a garrisoned pa at Ruatoki. Otenuku was then used by Tuhoe as a base from which to carry out attacks against surrendered Ngati Pukeko and Ngati Awa, as well as settlers and soldiers. St John reported that he believed that Hemi Kakitu, whom he described as a leader of the Hauhau party, was to be found at Otenuku. This band had engaged in rustling horses and driving oâ Ngati Pukeko cattle from the conâscated territories.⁴

St John realised the strategic importance of Otenuku, saying that it was presently not safe for Europeans to go south of the mill (presumably at Poronui). Otenuku could be 'advantageously occupied' by the Ngati Pukeko and a few Europeans, who would then be able to guard the entrance from Urewera to Whakatane. Alternatively, he oâered the suggestion that it could be destroyed. St John, reëcting on the military build-up in Ruatoki, said that he wanted to attack the pa via Waimana but:

Major Mair is of the opinion that such a proceeding would amount to giving the Natives a casus belli, but admits that the fact of the Hauhaus dispossessing the better-disposed of their own tribe of their land, driving away and looting the cattle of the Ngatipukekos, openly declaring that they wish to âght the Pakehas, and actually coming armed with intent into the conâscated land, is tantamount to very much the same thing on their part . . . In the hands of the Hauhaus, [Otenuku's] occupation paralyzes the whole of the Whakatane.⁵

The problem that St John had in making any advance on Ruatoki was that Rakuraku and his hapu informed their relatives of any movement made by the military at Waimana from their vantage point at Ohiwa. Rakuraku's people had moved back to Ohiwa after Tamaikoha had occupied Rakuraku's pa at Te Waimana, and after his claim had been dismissed in the court. Like Te Makarini returning to Opouriao, Rakuraku's occupation of Whakarae and Hokianga Island could be seen as a last-ditch attempt to assert ownership of conâscated lands. St John was moved to comment that 'not the slightest doubt exists as to his [Rakuraku's] doublefacedness . . . They are neither more nor less than a lot of spies', who

2. St John to Captain Holt, 19 September 1867, AJHR, 1868, a-8a, p 3

3. S Melbourne, 'Te Manemanerau a te Kawanatanga: A History of the Conâscation of Tuhoe Lands in the Bay of Plenty', MA thesis, University of Waikato, 1987, p 85

4. St John to Captain Holt, 19 September 1867, AJHR, 1868, a-8a, p 3

5. Ibid, p 4

communicated all troop movements up and down the Waimana and Whakatane valleys.⁶ St John noted that, when he had deported Te Makarini to Whakatane, Clarke had suggested that the same treatment be meted out to Rakuraku:

He [Rakuraku] and his mob ought to be got out of that place [Ohiwa]. They correspond directly up the Waimana with the Hauhaus, and any move from here in that direction would be known at once. If I get leave to attempt Ruatoki, I should have to begin by sending a small force to get every man of Raku's hapu on the island [Hokianga], seizing the canoes, and thus prevent all communication.⁷

Apparently, Ngati Awa oäered to accomodate Rakuraku's party at Ohope reserve and St John thought that some of the Upokorehe could stay with relatives at Opape reserve, but Rakuraku declined to retire from Ohiwa. Further, Holt (the under-secretary of the Defence Oice) informed St John that he was not to make any move against 'the Hauhau' that was not 'necessary for the defence of Opotiki'.⁸

The air was rife with rumours of imminent rebel attack on Opotiki by early 1868, but not all Tuhoe appeared to support Tamaikoha's guerilla tactics. A hui at Ahikereru in late 1867 resolved to make peace with the Pakeha and had banished those men who had participated in murders of the military and settlers.⁹ This had probably been a Ngati Whare hui.

Rakuraku then informed Mair that a large hui had taken place in Ruatahuna, and had been attended by the Whakatohea and by messengers from Ngati Kahungunu and from Matutaera (Tawhiao). Letters from the King had been read, and 'their tone was decidedly threatening'.¹⁰ The hui was apparently called to discuss whether Tuhoe should continue resisting the conâscation and incursions in their territory, but as recounted by Rakuraku, the hui was unable to reach agreement on what course of action to take: 'some chiefs were in favour of immediate action, others of waiting for Waikato [the Kingitanga] to begin, while many counselled neutrality'.¹¹

Tawhiao sent two messages to the Urewera: one was to encourage Tuhoe mobilisation against the Pakeha, the other was a prophecy that Tuhoe's saviour would come from the sea.¹² Melbourne says that there was no agreement as to the interpretation of the prophecy and immediate reactions to the question of war were divided. Te Whenuanui, supported by the people of Ruatahuna, Maungapohatu, and Waikaremoana, did not wish to invite military forces into the heart of the Urewera and opted to remain neutral, while those hapu most äected by the conâscations at Ruatoki and Waimana were for åghting.¹³ Mair noted that the chief Paerau had attempted to negotiate for peace, but this had been contrary to the wishes of his

6. Ibid

7. Ibid

8. J Holt to Major St John, 15 October 1867, AJHR, 1868, a-8a, p 4

9. St John to J Holt, 12 December 1867, AJHR, 1868, a-8a, p 4

10. Memorandum from Mair to St John, not dated (early January 1868), AJHR, 1868, a-8a, p 7

11. Ibid

12. This has subsequently been interpreted to refer to Te Kooti.

13. Melbourne, p 86; Pou Temara, 'Te Whenuanui', in *1870–1900*, p 529

people.¹⁴ By late January 1868, however, St John was unearthing rumours that the Ruatahuna people were about to join ‘the movement’.¹⁵ Rakuraku reported that he had wanted to go to Maungapohatu from Tawhana but had been stopped from doing so at Te Kumete by Ngati Kahu, and also said that, apart from the Te Whaiti and Ruatahuna people, ‘the Uriwera [were] wretchedly in want of clothing, and that a disease has appeared among them lately of which many of them [had] died’.¹⁶

Tamaikoha’s raids intensified after the Compensation Court sittings through to late 1868.¹⁷ After driving surveyors away from Waimana in July 1867, Tamaikoha occupied Rakuraku’s pa and established large cultivations in the valley.¹⁸ He was persistent in pursuing the strategy of guerilla raids in the Opotiki district and, particularly, on military settlements from his bases in the Waimana, Waioeka, and Whakatane valleys on the northern Tuhoe borderlands. After a visit to Otara in the Waimana Gorge, Rakuraku reported to Mair on about 21 January 1868 that a force of about 170 men, of eight different Tuhoe hapu, had left the previous day in the direction of Waioeka and Waiotahi. Their intention was to attack Opotiki, Opape, and Ohiwa, Rakuraku believed, in consequence of the words they had received from Tawhiao.¹⁹

Shortly afterward, a large Tuhoe party raided Ohiwa and Waiotahi, terrorising the loyalist Maori who lived there.²⁰ However, no concerted large-scale attack on Opotiki materialised. Wepiha Apanui told Mair that the Urewera forces were at Te Waimana, from whence they had been looting horses and cattle at Whakatane and intimidating the inhabitants of Ohope.²¹ St John, tired of waiting and resentful of the Government’s reluctance to engage ‘Hauhau rebels’ in action, decided to attack on 10 February. He led a group of 90 Opotiki Volunteer Rangers and militiamen up the Waimana Gorge, where they killed three Tuhoe (one from Maungapohatu and another from Ruatahuna, while the third had unknown hapu affiliations) in an encounter.²² St John then attacked a small kainga at the head of the Waimana valley, but Tuhoe were entrenched in the hills surrounding this spot and were easily able to track their enemy. St John had to withdraw as Tuhoe reinforcements arrived, but he seemed pleased to report that Tamaikoha had been wounded in the attack. According to Sissons, however, the given reason of withdrawal owing to a fear of being outnumbered was ‘a common rationalisation for defeat used by the colonial forces’, and, further, St John later found out that Tamaikoha had not been present at

14. W Mair to H T Clarke, 9 January 1868, AJHR, 1868, a-8a, p 21

15. St John to Captain Holt, 27 January 1868, AJHR, 1868, a-8a, p 9

16. W Mair to H T Clarke, 9 January 1868, AJHR, 1868, a-8a, p 21

17. Melbourne, p 57; J Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars: A History of the Maori Campaigns and the Pioneering Period*, 2 vols, Wellington, Government Printer, 1983, vol 2, pp 174–178; J Belich, *The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict*, Auckland, Auckland University Press, 1986, pp 210–211

18. J Sissons, *Te Waimana: The Spring of Mana: Tuhoe History and the Colonial Encounter*, Te Whenua Series No 6, Dunedin, University of Otago Press, 1991, p 129

19. Rakuraku to W Mair, 21 January 1868, and memorandum from W Mair to Major St John, 22 January 1868, AJHR, 1868, a-8a, pp 8–9

20. Cowan, p 177

21. St John to Captain Holt, 8 February 1868, AJHR, 1868, a-8a, p 12

22. St John to Captain Holt, 11 February 1868, AJHR, 1868, a-8a, p 13

this fighting.²³ The Maori forces had actually been led by Te Puehu.²⁴ From letters recovered in the raid, St John thought he had reason to believe that the 'whole of the Uriwera from Ruatahuna and [Maungapohatu] are in arms' and he also reported that every survey peg of the conascation line at Waimana had been pulled out of the ground.²⁵

The colonial forces at Opotiki were strengthened by a division of Armed Constabulary and 100 Arawa troops, in response to what was seen as a growing Tuhoe threat. The constabulary and an engineer corps were posted at Puketi, where they were given orders to build a redoubt. They were placed under the command of Major Fraser and told that they could traverse any part of the conascated territory but were not to go beyond it unless attacked or seriously threatened.²⁶

Tuhoe, meanwhile, had decamped from Te Waimana further up the valley to Matahi, where they fortified their position. In early March, however, a large force moved down the Waimana to Ohiwa, where Upokorehe and Rakuraku's people were still living. A smaller group of 10 men crossed the harbour to Hokianga Island and killed an Upokorehe elder named Te Korotahi, for reasons which are obscure.²⁷ They also burned down huts at Rakuraku's settlement.²⁸ This prompted another expedition by the colonial forces into the Waimana valley, with the intention of going as far as Maungapohatu. The 200-strong force marched past Matahi to a place called Te Ponga, where Tuhoe lay in wait for them. An officer named Rushton described why the forces decided, again, to retreat:

I voted to retire, for I knew that Tamaikowha [sic] was strongly entrenched in a very strong position at Tauwharemanuka . . . It would have been a death trap for us. The officers decided not to continue the advance, and this, I believe, saved the force from destruction. We discovered that the Urewera were entrenched on the spurs all round commanding the gorge, and when we had got into the jaws of the narrows, with riëe-pits on both sides, we would have got it hot.²⁹

St John would blame the Arawa forces for refusing to continue the advance, but Mair later reported that the European soldiers had also wanted to retreat.³⁰ According to Sissons, Government troops never tried to attack Tamaikoha in the Tauranga valley again.

As we have noted, by March 1868, the continuing assaults on loyalist tribes and settlers forced the Government to build a redoubt on the right bank of the junction between the Waimana and Whakatane Rivers at Puketi. In early May, a party of Tuhoe attacked Major Fraser and Ngati Pukeko road gangs at Puketi. The 'Hauhau' were, St John believed, largely from Ruatahuna and were led by Tamaikoha and

23. Sissons, p 130

24. St John to Captain Holt, 18 February 1868, AJHR, 1868, a-8a, p 15

25. St John to Captain Holt, 11 February 1868, AJHR, 1868, a-8a, p 13

26. T M Haultain, instructions for officer commanding Opotiki district, 6 March 1868, AJHR, 1868, a-8a, p 14

27. St John to Captain Holt, 17 March 1868, AJHR, 1868, a-8a, pp 16–17; Sissons, p 130

28. H T Clarke to under-secretary, Native Department, 14 March 1868, AJHR, 1868, a-8a, p 27

29. Cowan, p 178

30. T M Haultain to St John, 15 April 1868; St John to T M Haultain, 19 May 1868, AJHR, 1868, a-8a, p 18

Hetaraka. St John tracked the party to Ruatoki and then up the Whakatane valley as far as Waikarewhenua. He noted that, on his last visit to these places two years ago, they had been well populated but were now deserted. However, as they had left, Tuhoe had made provisions in the shape of potato pits for foraging taua, which St John destroyed:

There is no doubt that the Uriwera outposts abutting on the settlements are abandoned, and that a concentration has been effected on the line from [Maungapohatu] to Ruatahuna, whether for attack or defence it is impossible to state. Any parties coming now, however, down either the Waimana or Whakatane, will find themselves pushed for food.³¹

The following month, about 60 Arawa were posted at Ohiwa amid general rumours of an uprising by Tuhoe.³²

4.3 Settlement of Confiscated Land

The military allotments in Opouriao and Waimana were very vulnerable to attacks, being situated at the head of the Waimana and Whakatane valleys and uncomfortably close to the strongholds of Tamaikoha and Ngati Ira resistance fighters.³³ The grantees of these lots were not able to take possession of them immediately in 1867 because some Tuhoe people were still occupying Waimana and Opouriao lands (discussed above). After the removal of Tuhoe settlements behind the confiscation line, military settlement was still obstructed by the continuing threat posed by Tamaikoha. This meant that settlement in the Waimana valley was largely confined to the north-eastern portion of that valley.

Pitcairn and Leonard Simpson were the surveyors of these lots, which were determined by rank from 400 acres for a field officer to a private's 50 acres. None of the stated objectives of the military settlement on this confiscated land was achieved and none of the original military settlers stayed on their lot. An 1867 journal entry of one of the settlers gives his perception of why the scheme was a failure:

People are leaving here very fast and if they continue to leave at the same rate there will be no white men left here in six months. The Government plan of settlement seems to be a failure for several reasons. The first was that the men were not located on their land when their time was expired and another cause was that the officers had nearly all the best land . . . Then again men were murdered by the hauhaus or driven off their land and others were afraid to go out and cultivate theirs and some had no chance to go out on account of delay caused by unrest, while many never intended to

31. Major St John to Captain Holt, 10 May 1868, AJHR, 1868, a-8a, pp 19–20

32. The payment for this Arawa service was the granting of military allotments in 'surplus' land at Ohiwa (of no more than 25 acres for each man): see J C Richmond to H T Clarke, 29 June 1868, AJHR, 1868, a-8a, pp 20–21.

33. Whakatane was situated about 20 kilometres to the north of Opouriao, and Opotiki was roughly 30 kilometres away from Waimana.

settle at all, and these fully two thirds of the regiment composed. As soon as their pay and rations were done they sold up and left the country. We are now reduced in Opotiki to a very small number and two thirds of them want to leave.³⁴

After peace had been established in Waimana in 1870, unoccupied lots in this area were disposed of by ballot (this will be more fully discussed in chapter 5). The failure of the military settlement in the Whakatane and Waimana valleys left the way open for land aggregation and the establishment of large private estates in the period following conascation.

4.4 Tuhoe and Te Kooti

4.4.1 Introduction

Belich has generalised that the years from November 1866 to July 1868 were relatively peaceful in the North Island, save for 'small scale' fighting at Rotorua, Tauranga, and Opotiki.³⁵ He attributes this, in part, to the lessening effectiveness of the Maori resistance against colonisation and conascation in the years 1864–68. Belich, in fact, terms this period the 'nadir' of the resistance, marked by the reduced influence of the King movement after the end of the Waikato war, and a correspondingly local and fractured response to Government, kupapa, and colonists' intrusions in other parts of the North Island.³⁶

Certainly, the fighting in the Opotiki and Urewera districts that affected Tuhoe was not characterised by episodes such as Orakau, and there was not the dramatic loss of life that had been sustained at that one battle.³⁷ However 'small scale' the eastern Bay of Plenty fighting may have been in the larger scheme of things, though, it was a critical time for Tuhoe, who, it appears, had largely gone to the Waikato precisely in order to stop the colonists before they had reached the Tuhoe rohe. Conascation and Pai Marire had now brought the wars to their doorstep and there was, by no means, a Tuhoe consensus as to the strategy that they should employ to regain their conascated lands. By 1868, it could be seen that most Tuhoe were still uneasy about a commitment to full-scale war and the active resistance that had rallied was largely undertaken by Ruatoki and Waimana hapu. This had been successful, to some extent, in retarding settlement of land Tuhoe claimed as theirs but notably it had not returned the land to Tuhoe control, nor had it made the Government acknowledge Tuhoe authorities. The other simultaneous tactic employed by Tuhoe had been their participation in the Compensation Court proceedings (the interior, Tamakaimoana, hapu participation in court should be noted). As we have seen, this was a less than fruitful exercise.

34. H D G White (ed), 'The Diary of Alfred Parkinson, Opotiki, 1867', *Historical Review*, vol 20, no 1, May 1972, p 34

35. Belich, p 210

36. Ibid, pp 211–216

37. The battle at Te Tapiri in 1866 was a possible exception to this generalisation.

Many, but not all, Tuhoe had supported the Kingitanga and many, but not all, Tuhoe had supported Pai Marire. Tuhoe leaders had, at times, sought a broad political consensus, but the complicated nature of the New Zealand wars, the intersection of different interests, and the high stakes involved made this all but impossible to achieve. It was easy enough to characterise the general Tuhoe stance in 1867–68 as anti-Government but less easy to co-opt what appeared to be some highly independent Tuhoe leaders, such as Tamaikoha, in a united action. There was no easily defined course of action open at mid-1868.

The initiative, however, was temporarily taken out of Tuhoe hands as the focus of Tuhoe resistance against Government actions shifted dramatically from the Bay of Plenty to Poverty Bay. Tamaikoha aside, as late 1868 progressed, the Government became preoccupied with the pursuit of another Maori leader who galvanised resistance against the confiscations, who opened a new chapter in Tuhoe's involvement in the New Zealand wars, and who left Tuhoe a lingering spiritual and political legacy.

4.4.2 Te Kooti ees to Ngatapa

Much has been written about Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki; notably of late Judith Binney's book *Redemption Songs*, published in 1995. The following sections discussing Te Kooti are highly reliant upon this source.³⁸

Te Kooti's emergence as a significant player in the narrative of the Tuhoe confiscations and Tuhoe's relationship with the Crown occurs in 1868, within the tangled matrix of the East Coast wars. When Pai Marire emissaries sent by Te Ua arrived on the East Coast in early 1865, they ignited civil wars within Ngati Porou and, later, within Ngati Kahungunu, and generated fighting in the Poverty Bay districts among people divided in their loyalties to the Crown, and divided over land sales to Europeans and the extension of Government authority. These thorny questions were but overlays upon traditional hostilities and rivalries; combined, they served to polarise the Maori population of the East Coast, many of whom had hitherto tried to retain a policy of neutrality. Unlike the Waikato and Taranaki conflicts, the role of kupapa in the East Coast conflicts and in the Urewera was an important military factor in the Government campaigns against 'rebels'.³⁹ These so-called loyalist 'Queenite' Maori had their own ambitions and collaborated with the Government, as Belich rightly points out, because it served their own interests, of both traditional and contemporary origins.

Te Kooti, born of the Rongowhakaata tribe of Poverty Bay, had actually seen action as a kupapa with the colonial army in the siege of the Hauhau stronghold of Waerenga a Hika in November 1865. He was arrested for firing blanks at the rebels, released for want of evidence, and then rearrested in March 1866, under the accusation of being a Hauhau spy. It seems an accepted likelihood by various

38. Judith Binney, *Redemption Songs: A Life of Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki*, Auckland, Auckland University Press and Bridget Williams Books Ltd, 1995

39. Belich, p 211

commentators, however, that the charges were probably manufactured by the Maori and Pakeha establishment of Poverty Bay, who perceived Te Kooti as an influential rival.⁴⁰

Te Kooti was deported to the Chatham Islands, Wharekauri, along with Pai Marire captives of the Government, where he remained until his escape in 1868. It was during this period of exile that Te Kooti developed the basic tenets and services of Ringatu, 'arguably the most comprehensive, sophisticated, and resilient of the new Maori religions'.⁴¹ Ringatu held a millennial, redemptive promise for the prisoners on Wharekauri, drawing a parallel between their experiences and those of the Israelites held in bondage in the Old Testament. Te Kooti assumed the mantle of the mouthpiece of God and convinced his fellow captives of this special relationship, securing their allegiance and becoming their leader. Commandeering a vessel on the Chathams, Te Kooti and the other prisoners escaped to Poverty Bay, arriving in July 1868.

Ignoring Government demands that the escapees surrender unconditionally, Te Kooti communicated that he would not surrender his arms and wished to travel in peace to the Waikato. Webster, however, mentions evidence that Te Kooti was actually heading for Ahikereru kainga in the Urewera.⁴² The escapees would only fight if they were intercepted or otherwise attacked.⁴³ They were, however, attacked as they started for Waikato; Te Kooti triumphed over Government troops in engagements at Paparatu, Te Koneke, and Ruakituri between July and August. These victories raised the esteem in which Te Kooti was held by the people of the upper Wairoa and surrounding districts. Colonel Whitmore, commander of the colonial forces pursuing Te Kooti, would later comment that Paparatu had been very significant: 'Undoubtedly the extraordinary prestige this remarkable man afterwards acquired sprang from this brilliant, and to the Maori mind, inexplicable success.'⁴⁴

Te Kooti proceeded to the ancient pa of Puketapu which overlooked the Ruakituri River on the edges of the Urewera country. From there he wrote letters to both King Tawhiao and Tuhoe, seeking permission to enter their respective territories.⁴⁵ Tawhiao, however, had declared 1867–68 as the 'Year of the Lamb' and told Te Kooti that he could expect no assistance from the Kingitanga. Te Kooti was not to fight or renew the wars and would be repelled if he encroached upon the Rohe Potae.⁴⁶ Tuhoe held a hui at Ahikereru in October, attended by several of Te Kooti's whakarau, at which it was decided that Te Kooti could stay in the upper Wairoa and hold 'the confiscated or ceded land there'.⁴⁷ According to Binney,

40. Ibid, p 217

41. Ibid, p 218

42. P Webster, *Rua and the Maori Millennium*, Wellington, Price Milburn for Victoria University Press, 1979, p 110

43. Binney, pp 90–93

44. Whitmore (quoted in Cowan, p 236)

45. Binney, p 102

46. Ibid, pp 102–103, 134

47. Ibid, p 103

Tuhoe also made it plain that the Government was not to advance upon Puketapu through its territory.

The conâscated land referred to in this exchange was the upper Wairoa and Waikaremoana lands that had been declared subject to the East Coast Lands Titles Investigation Act 1866. The Government secured a ‘cession’ of 42,430 acres, with the remainder of the declared land, between the Waiiau and Wairoa Rivers, stretching back to Lake Waikaremoana, earmarked for ‘return’ to ‘loyal’ chiefs. This Act had been in retaliation for the support given to Pai Marire and anti-Government activities by many of the Maori who occupied the upper Wairoa area. It is not clear, yet, what Tuhoe’s understanding of the East Coast Lands Titles Investigation Act was, but they seem to refer to this general district as conâscated. This cession, and the subsequent Crown purchase of the rest of the land, lies outside the boundaries of district 4 of the Rangahaua Whanui project and consequently has been researched and discussed in other Rangahaua Whanui district reports, but a brief summary of these events is provided in chapter 5 of this report.⁴⁸ Suïce to say here, the possibility that Te Kooti might have been able to return this land to its rightful owners was a powerful inducement for many Ruapani, and those closely related hapu of Kahungunu, to lend their support to Te Kooti.⁴⁹

In the meantime, only a few Tuhoe from Te Whaiti went to Puketapu to join Te Kooti, and it would be some months before Tuhoe would wholly commit themselves and their land to Te Kooti. He could not, then, advance through their rohe without inviting serious trouble and neither could he ëee to the Rohe Potae. This situation, coupled with the colonial forces’ encircling of Puketapu, probably contributed to his decision to return to Poverty Bay.

Poverty Bay was, of course, the scene of Te Kooti’s infamous Matawhero raid, more popularly known to a European audience as the Poverty Bay massacre. Te Kooti and his force killed 60 inhabitants, both Maori and Pakeha, at Matawhero, including the local magistrate, Biggs, who was a notable personal enemy of Te Kooti’s. Binney states that Te Kooti’s objective in attacking the settlement had been the ‘reclaiming’ of the land and its people.⁵⁰ However, the raid at Poverty Bay aroused horror among the European population in particular and, coupled with the campaign against Titokowaru on the west coast, threw the settler community into crisis. The gory and unpleasant details of the killings would be exaggerated and widely publicised, while the resistance âghters’ perspective of the issues underlying the episode would be underplayed, if not ignored. The actions of Te Kooti and his followers only reinforced the negative settler view of Tuhoe, when that iwi decided to lend him sanctuary.

Te Kooti journeyed inland from the plains to Ngatapa in the high back country, about 25 kilometres from Gisborne, pursued by Ngati Kahungunu kupapa

48. Refer to Joy Hippolite, *Wairoa*, Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui Series (working paper: ârst release), November 1996, and Siân Daly, *Poverty Bay*, Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui Series (working paper: ârst release), February 1997

49. V O’Malley, ‘The Crown and Ngati Ruapani: Conâscation and Land Purchase in the Wairoa–Waikaremoana Area, 1865–1875’, 1994 (Wai 144 rod, doc a3), ch 14

50. Binney, p 131

commanded by Colonel George Whitmore (subsequently they were assisted by Ngati Porou kupapa). The battle that followed resulted in the deaths and executions of many of Te Kooti’s followers, but Te Kooti himself and a few survivors escaped. During the seige of Ngatapa, Te Kooti had managed to send messages to Tuhoe, imploring them to send recruits and give him sanctuary, but Tuhoe were awaiting a hui called for January 1869; in the meantime, however, a small number of Tuhoe from Maungapohatu, perhaps 30, joined Te Kooti’s force.⁵¹

From Ngatapa, Te Kooti travelled to Te Wera at the headwaters of the Motu River, where the Ngati Ira chief Hira Te Popo oäered refuge.⁵² In mid-February, he was joined by a small party from Maungapohatu and, upon invitation, went to that place to meet some of the Tuhoe chiefs. Here, Te Kooti forged an alliance with, amongst others, two of the major Ruatahuna chiefs; Te Whenuanui and Paerau. They accompanied him, Binney says, because he was committed to the restitution of the conâscated land of the upper Wairoa and Waikaremoana.⁵³ According to Wepiha Apanui, who had been informed by Rakuraku, the guerilla attacks were to be revived and Te Kooti next planned to strike Ohiwa.

4.4.3 Te Kooti’s sacred pact with Tuhoe, March 1869

In early March, Te Kooti’s force, estimated at 130–140 men, arrived at Otarā in the Waimana gorge. This was the territory of Tamaikoha and while Mair and others believed that Te Kooti and Tamaikoha were allied, this was not the case. According to Binney, Tamaikoha was strongly opposed to Te Kooti’s religious teachings and refused to äght with him.⁵⁴ He did, however, consent to Te Kooti passing through his settlement of Tawhana.

It was at Tawhana in March that Te Kooti made a sacred pact with Tuhoe, which bound them to the fortunes of this charismatic leader. Te Kooti swore an oath to Tuhoe, echoing promises God had made to Moses:

You drew me out of darkness. You have sent the people into the äames of the äre, into the tests, since the landing [this] has gone on. Listen, this is what *I have to say*, ‘I take you as my people, and I will be your God; you will know that I am Jehovah’. You are the people of the covenant. [Emphasis in original.]⁵⁵

In return, Tuhoe promised Te Kooti their land and loyalty. The chiefs who committed themselves to this vision included Kereru, Paerau, Te Purewa, Te Makarini, Te Whenuanui, Te Ahikaiata, Tutakangahau, Te Haunui, and Te Puehu. Binney explains the dynamic between Te Kooti and Tuhoe thus:

He had allied with some (but not all) of Tuhoe, whose cause was the rights of Maori in their own tribal lands. They saw themselves as the oppressed because of their

51. Ibid, p 134

52. Ibid, pp 148–149

53. Ibid, pp 151, 154

54. Ibid, p 154

55. Ibid

recent experiences. They were not simply men living in the past: they had specific and legitimate grievances. Te Kooti offered a new order, and it seemed that he might achieve it. This new order rejected the Maori kingship as a failed experiment, already being eroded by whispering words from the government. This judgement was harsh, but it recognised that the King would no longer fight. Te Kooti instead sought to direct people through his vision, based in the covenant promises given to the Chosen of God. He also warned them of the consequences of faltering in the pursuit of this vision: their own destruction. It was a fearsome vision to which many Tuhoe were drawn.⁵⁶

Te Kooti and Tuhoe then set out for Rakuraku's pa at Whakarae, situated in the contested territory near Ohiwa. According to Cowan, Rakuraku and his people became 'willing prisoners or converts'.⁵⁷ In fact, the 'taking' of the pa was a manoeuvre designed to disguise the chief's support of Te Kooti, who received all the guns and ammunition Rakuraku held. From Whakarae, a party that included some of Rakuraku's men was sent forth to raid the nearby harbour. On 2 March, Robert Pitcairn, a surveyor, was killed on Uretara Island, where he had camped. At the same time, the Upokorehe people living on Hokianga were brought back to Whakarae as prisoners.

A few days later, on 9 March, Te Kooti struck again. He attacked the Ngati Pukeko settlement of Te Rauporoa Pa, on the west bank of the Whakatane River. The chiefs Hori Tunui and Heremia Mokai were killed (Cowan alleges that Mehaka Tokopounamu shot Hori Tunui).⁵⁸ After a two-day siege, the rest of Ngati Pukeko were forced to come to terms with Te Kooti and evacuate their position.⁵⁹ This was consolidated by a further attack on the Ngati Pukeko mill at Poronui and a redoubt built for its protection, on the eastern side of the Whakatane River, during which the mill and wheat fields belonging to Ngati Pukeko were burnt.⁶⁰ In the meantime, another party, chiefly composed of Tuhoe, raided Whakatane, burning and looting stores there.⁶¹ These exploits had the effect of giving Te Kooti and Tuhoe the control of the area around the Whakatane River mouth for the time being but had been disappointing in terms of gaining ammunition, arms, and recruits.

About 200 militia and kupapa, under Major William Mair, Captain Henry Mair, and Lieutenant Gilbert Mair, left Opotiki and Matata, while Te Kooti withdrew inland up the Rangitaiki River to Tauaroa, a Patuheuheu pa.⁶² Patuheuheu would commit themselves to Te Kooti for the next two years, unlike their Ngati Manawa kin, who fled to Motumako on the Kaingaroa side of the Rangitaiki as Te Kooti approached. W Mair had thought Te Kooti too strong to attack at Rangitaiki, but mounted an ineffectual siege at Tauaroa when Te Arawa reinforcements arrived; however, Te Kooti slipped away into the Urewera under night cover.⁶³ He headed

56. Ibid, p 155

57. Cowan, p 498 (cited in Sissons, p 133)

58. Cowan, p 321

59. Binney, p 157

60. Ibid

61. Cowan, p 324

62. Tauaroa is near modern Galatea: Binney, p 157; Belich, p 276.

for Te Harema Pa at Ahikereru, where Ngati Whare sheltered him, and from there he planned his next assault on Mohaka.

This raid, which occurred on 10 April, was in revenge for Ngati Kahungunu's attacks upon Te Kooti in 1868 after the landing from Wharekauri, and because there were Government munitions stored there. Te Whenuanui and Paerau accompanied Te Kooti at Mohaka, where Kawanatanga Maori and settlers were killed in a lightning attack. Cowan quotes Peita Kotuku as saying many of the killings were carried out by the Tuhoe fighting men, who were 'ancient enemies' of the Ngati Pahauwera.⁶⁴ The party returned to the Urewera via Wairau moana, after repelling a small Ngati Kahungunu force the next day.⁶⁵

4.5 The First Urewera Expedition

The raid at Mohaka was the final straw for Whitmore and for the Government, and it brought the wars to the heartland of the Urewera. For Whitmore understood that, while the Urewera mountains remained unpenetrated by Government forces, there would always be a sanctuary from which Te Kooti could descend and to which he could return to restore his strength. Tuhoe had to be attacked so that they could no longer shelter Te Kooti; and this meant, in effect, adopting a scorched earth policy to cripple the tribe economically. Whitmore reasoned that he had to completely blockade the Urewera to prevent Te Kooti attacking the surrounding districts, and to prevent his escape to Taupo. From Taupo, it would be easy for Te Kooti to access the King Country, Wanganui, and Waikato. This strategic point had been noted; Governor Grey had long advocated a military headquarters at Taupo, precisely as a means of controlling the central North Island.⁶⁶ Whitmore, then, set about planning an invasion of the Urewera in mid-April, apparently in spite of reservations expressed by the Minister of Defence.⁶⁷

Whitmore organised a three-armed assault on the fastnesses, 'from which troops had always hitherto recoiled'.⁶⁸ It was to be no easy task:

The difficulties of such a campaign are chiefly those due to long land carriage, and to the unknown character of the country. It is known to have stopped the Ngapuhi long ago, and it has hitherto been impossible to bring troops to its outskirts. What fortifications may exist in it are unknown, and a very great part of it can only be supplied by provisions carried on men's backs. There is no sound land for some distance from the coast – and if there was, there are no drays obtainable . . . Nobody better than I can appreciate the difficulty before me, having last year spent eighteen

63. Binney, pp 157–158; Belich, p 276

64. Cowan, p 328

65. Cowan recorded Tupara Kaaho of Ruatoki as saying that Tuhoe lost two chiefs called Ihaiaa and Kereopa at Mohaka: Cowan, p 335.

66. W Spring-Rice, 'The History and Archaeology of Fort Galatea, Bay of Plenty, New Zealand, 1869–1969', MA thesis, University of Auckland, 1983, pp 21–22

67. Belich, p 277

68. Colonel G S Whitmore to Haultain, 23 April 1869, AJHR, 1869, a-3, p 44

days in hard marching on the mere outskirts of this district. The country is already doubtless under snow. The hills are so steep, that åve miles as the bird eyes is a long day's march. The enemy is sure to ambuscade and delay our march . . . our force being largely composed of Native allies, to whom cold is hateful, and on whom it exercises an effect which they cannot shake oä, may disperse like melting snow at any moment, even on the eve of completing all the objects of the expedition. All that can be done, with a full foreknowledge of these rocks which may shatter our enterprise, the Government may depend upon our doing; but this undertaking is so diäerent from any other as yet attempted, and so much more liable to miscarriage, that I deem it a duty not to be sanguine myself, or to lead the Government to expect too much.⁶⁹

The colonel planned one column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Herrick, to advance from Wairoa and enter the Urewera by crossing Lake Waikaremoana. Another column, headed by Lieutenant-Colonel St John, was to leave Opotiki, and enter the Urewera via the Whakatane River. The third arm of the expedition was to be led by Whitmore himself and Major Roberts, leaving Opotiki, and then building a chain of forts from Matata up to Tauaroa, eventually to penetrate the Urewera from a western entrance.⁷⁰ In all, there were about 1300 troops at Whitmore's disposal. These forces were to rendezvous at Ruatahuna, strategically and symbolically very important to Tuhoe; in this connection, Binney has quoted a whakatauki of Tuhoe's:

*If my neck is to be severed, it must be severed in Ruatahuna.*⁷¹

If Cowan is correct, the only real geographic information available to the forces was based upon information and a map made by the Reverend James Preece (who had been stationed at Ahikereru and whose son was now Whitmore's interpreter) and the notes made by Hunter Brown in 1862.⁷²

Whitmore reached Te Harema Pa at Ahikereru on 6 May. It was occupied mainly by women and children, because the men were either away with Te Kooti or in the nearby valley tending crops, thus, 'all [Hauhau] could not be killed'.⁷³ It was attacked none the less, and the women and children given to the Te Arawa troops, in a calculated attempt to destroy Ngati Whare. Binney characterises this as a 'deliberate and remorseless unleashing of tribal hostilities by the government'.⁷⁴ In the meantime, St John had come under heavy attack near Tatahoata but met with Whitmore at Ruatahuna on 8 May. Herrick's expedition from Waikaremoana, however, had been an expensive failure; by the time the boats needed to cross the lake had been built, the expedition was long over.

At all the Ruatahuna settlements, stock and crops were systematically destroyed and fences pulled down so that wild pigs could complete the destruction. To add

69. Ibid

70. Ibid; Belich p 277

71. Binney, p 165

72. Cowan, p 337

73. Whitmore to Haultain, 18 May 1869, AJHR, 1869, a-3, p 48

74. Binney, p 165

insult to this severe injury, Ngaitai kupapa desecrated the highly tapu grave of the ancestor Murakareke, sited on the Tahora ridge.⁷⁵ According to Whitmore, Tuhoe 'made a very poor fight at Ruatahuna', and mainly scattered into the dense surrounding bush.⁷⁶ The next two days saw Whitmore dispatch what he euphemistically termed 'foraging parties' to destroy kainga in the Ruatahuna vale. Some years later, he would recall:

So hopelessly had the native inhabitants lost confidence in themselves and their fastness that they did not attempt to molest the foragers or combine to avenge themselves on the invaders, but scattered in to small groups, occupied the hilltops, and made the mountains resound with their sorrowing tangis and lamentations.⁷⁷

While Government forces ravaged Ahikereru and Ruatahuna, Te Kooti remained on the northern shores of Waikaremoana, awaiting an attack that did not come. The Arawa forces refused to move beyond Ruatahuna to Waikaremoana ostensibly, Whitmore suggested, because they feared the 'terrible loss' suffered by Tuhoe's enemies in these mountains. (Binney also suggests that they were tired of working as 'slaves' without the command of their own chiefs.⁷⁸) The colonial forces began their withdrawal from Urewera on 14 May 1869, returning via Oputao, and Ahikereru, and then the Horomanga Gorge, pausing to destroy the kainga there. The withdrawal was complete by 18 May. Whitmore had not captured or killed Te Kooti, but the expedition was, at the least, a psychological success:

[It] did a great deal to dispel the mystery which had enveloped that savage region, and to demolish its reported impregnable character. For the first time its physiography became accurately known, and, despite the formidable natural obstacles, it was proved that the country was not inaccessible to white troops.⁷⁹

Belich says that Tuhoe's resistance had been 'piecemeal', with little or no coordination, and that they suffered casualties of at least 20 people killed and about 50 captured. In Belich's estimation, this loss, combined with the destruction of their property, permanently weakened Tuhoe.⁸⁰ Further research would be needed before a confident explanation for Tuhoe's lack of coordination could be offered.

Whitmore had gambled that the invasion would force Te Kooti into open country. Binney says, in fact, that Tuhoe told Te Kooti to leave their land at this time, while Belich points out that Taupo was better able to supply the resistance in winter than Urewera, and that Taupo sympathisers had invited Te Kooti there before Whitmore's invasion had even begun.⁸¹ Whatever the reason, Te Kooti and about

75. Cowan, p 351

76. Whitmore to Haultain, 18 May 1869, AJHR, 1869, a-3, p 49

77. G S Whitmore, *The Last Maori War in New Zealand under the Self-Reliant Policy*, London, Low Marston, 1902, p 116 (quoted in Webster, p 118)

78. Whitmore to Haultain, 18 May 1869, AJHR, 1869, a-3, p 50; Binney, p 165

79. Cowan, p 358

80. Belich, p 279

81. Binney, p 165; Belich, p 279. Binney says (p 169) that Te Kooti actually went to Taupo because Paora Hapi had deãed him, not invited him.




Figure 10: Te Kooti's eight, July 1868–May 1872

200 followers left Urewera by crossing the Kaingaroa Plains, emerging at Opepe on the Taupo–Napier road. Te Kooti subsequently undertook operations to the north and south of Lake Taupo.

In June, however, a number of the Tuhoe who had accompanied Te Kooti to Taupo turned back to Urewera because they had heard that Herrick's delayed

Waikaremoana expedition had occupied Onepoto, sited on conâscated land to the south and south-east of the lake. At the same time, Whitmore's relieving officer, Harrington, decided to abandon the forts (Alfred, Clarke, and Galatea) on the fringes of western Urewera. This, and a change of Ministry in June 1869, gave Te Kooti a three-month respite.⁸² After spending the winter months at Tokaanu, Te Kooti's force built a redoubt at Te Porere, where they were defeated in October by a combined Taupo, Arawa, and Ngati Kahungunu force commanded by McDonnell. Binney says that a number of Tuhoe chiefs, including Paerau, Hapurona Kohi, Te Makarini, Rakuraku, and Kereru Te Pukenui, had returned to Taupo and were at the Te Porere battle, while other Tuhoe stayed to defend Waikaremoana.⁸³

These chiefs remained with him as Te Kooti eed to Taumarunui and the King Country, and as he attempted to return to Urewera in February 1870. Te Kooti's ope decided to return via Rotorua and sent letters to Te Arawa chiefs asking for the right of passage through their lands.⁸⁴ Two men were dispatched by the chiefs to talk with Te Kooti (one of them was Kepa Te Ahuru, a Tuhoe trooper with the Armed Constabulary).⁸⁵ Though some of Te Arawa were prepared to make a truce with Te Kooti and let him pass, they were ignored by Gilbert Mair, who gave chase with 120 Te Arawa men. Only rearguard action, with the loss of Te Kooti's right-hand man, Te Peka Makarini, ensured that the band made it back to Urewera via the Horomanga Gorge.⁸⁶

4.6 The Second Urewera Expedition, March 1870

McLean, the new Minister of Defence in the Fox Ministry, instituted a new system of campaign against Te Kooti in February 1870. While Captains Preece and Gilbert Mair would command the 200-strong Te Arawa Flying Column on several expeditions in Urewera, most of the fighting was now to be done by Maori kupapa under their own tribal leadership. These fighters would no longer be paid a daily sum but would compete for a £5000 reward for Te Kooti, and lesser rewards for his followers.⁸⁷ While the Kawanatanga Maori were glad of their own military leaders, they disapproved of the new pay scheme and made up for the loss of wages through the subsequent plunder of Whakatohea and Tuhoe property.⁸⁸

Once again, a three-prong invasion was undertaken by the Government forces: Te Keepa (Major Kemp) and a group of Te Whanganui and Ngaitai marched up the

82. Belich, p 280

83. Binney, p 188

84. Ibid, p 206

85. Ibid. Kepa later joined Te Kooti, at one point acting as his second in command. He then rejoined the forces hunting Te Kooti, claiming he had been kidnapped. Binney says (p 207) that he 'played a double role' in the campaigns.

86. Binney, p 208; Belich, p 285

87. Belich, p 285

88. Ibid

Tauranga (Waimana) River; a Ngati Kahungunu column left from Napier; and Major Ropata Wahawaha and the Ngati Porou contingent left from Turanga.

Te Kooti had initially returned to Ahikereru but then travelled to the rugged country of Te Wera, a core centre of his support under Hira Te Popo. From there, Te Kooti renewed strikes on the communities of the eastern Bay of Plenty. He first attacked the loyalist chief Rangitukehu's mill on 28 February, torching it in revenge for support lent to the Government by Te Pahipoto, then he crossed eastward to Opape on 7 March. Te Kooti sought an infusion of men and ammunition to bolster his dwindling party, and if Maori were not willing resistance fighters, Te Kooti would intimidate them into joining him or take them as prisoners. He desperately needed more men as the attack on Tuhoe was revived. After raiding Opape, Te Kooti returned up the Waioeka River to Maraetahi Pa, where he established a village and gardens.⁸⁹

Once again, Tuhoe's homes and crops were laid waste as numerous kupapa columns crossed and swept through the Urewera mountains. On 5 March, Te Keepa Te Rangihwinui's contingent marched into the Waimana valley. Pushing up the river, Te Keepa fired warning shots before Tamaikoha's pa at Tauwharemanuka. He concluded a peace with Tamaikoha, who told Te Keepa that he had never supported Te Kooti, on about 10 March 1870.⁹⁰ Tamaikoha agreed to cease fighting and pledged neutrality on the conditions that there would be no survey or settlement of his remaining lands.⁹¹ The peace was sealed with ritual exchange: Te Keepa gave Tamaikoha a revolver and ammunition, while Tamaikoha gave the major information that Te Kooti was going to attack Whakatohea settlements on the coast. Te Keepa's force immediately turned back to the coast instead of continuing to Maungapohatu, but Te Kooti had already attacked Opape by this time. Flooding had meant that the news of it had been delayed.⁹²

It became evident that the peace was intended by Te Keepa to extend to the whole of Tuhoe, as he sent a flag of truce through to Tuhoe, who presented it to Major Ropata at Maungapohatu. Ropata's Ngati Porou force had already marched to Maungapohatu and had taken the pa of Toreatai on 13 March, when Tamaikoha also arrived in Maungapohatu with a letter from Te Keepa for the major. Ropata Wahawaha was furious with the terms of the peace, which required him to withdraw from Urewera and release his Tuhoe prisoners. After consulting with Captain Porter, second in command of the column, however, Ropata was reluctantly compelled to acknowledge the arrangement, but not before warning Tuhoe that if he had to return to Urewera, they would regret it. Leaving Maungapohatu, Ropata travelled down the Waimana valley with non-Tuhoe prisoners, who were not included in the peace agreement. He had an angry altercation with Tamaikoha, but the peace was not yet broken.⁹³

89. Binney, pp 210–211

90. Sissons, p 134

91. Binney, p 212

92. Ibid, pp 212–213

93. Ibid

Arriving in Opotiki, Ropata learnt that the Whanganui contingent had set oā up the Waioeka River the previous evening, hunting the resistance fighters led by Hira Te Popo. Ropata followed and soon encountered Te Kooti's guard, and then Te Kooti's settlement, at Maraetahi. Nineteen 'rebels' were killed, but Te Kooti and a close group of about 20, including Hira Te Popo and Rakuraku, narrowly escaped from Ropata's assault on Maraetahi. The previous day, Te Keepa and Topia Turoa's force attacked the nearby pa of Waipuna, where the Pai Marire emissaries Hakopa and Hakaria were killed. Kereopa, however, escaped. Te Kooti by this stage was accompanied by very few men, his followers having been killed, surrendered, or died of starvation. He fled even further inland, for the Waioeka headwaters. There he managed to re-establish a core group of about 50, called Nga Morehu (the survivors and the chosen few), who were probably all Tuhoe.

Both Tuhoe and Whakatohea hapu were subject to intense pressure to surrender, because it was clear that the iwi lent tacit support to the fugitives. In January 1870, the Tuhoe chief Te Whenuanui had sent indication to the Government that he wished to negotiate a peace. What it involved, however, from the Government's point of view, was that Tuhoe hapu would leave their homes and come down to Government reservations at Te Putere, near Matata, and live with Ngati Awa and Te Arawa Kawanatanga chiefs. This would be a sticking point for many Tuhoe.

In April 1870, Tamaikoha moved out to Whakarāe and sent a letter to Gilbert Mair, Te Keepa, and other former foes. He said that he had reached an agreement with other Urewera chiefs regarding peace proposals, and was adamant that, because Te Kooti was not sheltering within their territory, the colonial forces could not trespass on Tuhoe land: 'If you intrude my place there will be trouble. If you invade me when Te Kooti is not here, there will be trouble'.⁹⁴ Tamaikoha said that all of Tuhoe had returned to their homes and only two (unnamed) hapu still associated with Te Kooti. Binney notes that one of these was undoubtedly Ngati Huri, or Tamakaimoana, of Maungapohatu.⁹⁵ Additionally, Tuhoe posted notice of Kemp's and Tuhoe's peace on all the routes into their country. Ngati Whare chiefs wrote to Te Arawa telling them that they were keeping Te Keepa's peace but had no intention of being detained in Government reserves.⁹⁶

While Tuhoe seemed ready to abide by their accord with Te Keepa, which did not require them to vacate Urewera, the Government had never sanctioned Te Keepa's peace. It had not, however, communicated this to Tamaikoha. St John was outraged by Tamaikoha's warning to the Government not to trespass on his territory and told McLean that he planned to kill the chief. St John was told not to attack him. Tamaikoha went to Whakarāe to conclude peace negotiations with Ngati Awa, and on 25 April, St John attacked him there, despite knowing that the purpose of Tamaikoha's visit was to make peace. St John gloated that Tamaikoha had never

94. Ibid, p 225; Erueti Tamaikoha to Kemp, Topia, Kawana Paipai, and Mete Kingi, 18 April 1870, AJHR, 1870, a-8b, p 38; Tamaikoha to Major Mair, 18 April 1870, AJHR, 1870, a-8b, p 38

95. Binney, p 225

96. Ibid




Figure 11: Te Urewera – military campaigns, 1865–72

had such a close shave, but the chief's uncle, Tipene, was less fortunate, and was killed.⁹⁷

The Defence Minister was understandably furious that St John had so blatantly violated his instructions with an act he recognised as treachery. St John was actually removed from his command for his attack upon Tamaikoha at Whakarae, and his position was resumed by Major Mair. However, the Government's relationship with Tuhoe chiefs was damaged at a critical time when McLean was doing his utmost to pressure Tuhoe to surrender. Tuhoe chiefs sent a letter to Te Arawa stationed at Fort Galatea, angry at the kohuru or treachery in the peace with Tamaikoha, and bidding Te Arawa return to 'the sea'.⁹⁸ They also said that Te Kooti was not in Urewera – this was true. Ruatahuna chiefs had rejected a letter from Te Kooti that they had received on 27 April, denying him sanctuary. He was told to keep away, lest he invite further trouble to Tuhoe from the Kawanatanga forces.⁹⁹ At the same time, it would become clear to McLean that Tuhoe hapu even considering surrender were too nervous to do so after Whakarae, lest they be killed or have their land taken from them.

4.7 The Third Urewera Expedition, April 1870

McLean struggled to convince Tuhoe that he had not condoned St John's actions and that he intended to keep the peace with those Tuhoe who came in willingly. These offers of peace were simultaneously given while a third expedition into Urewera was mounted. From 6 April, Captains Preece and Mair and the Arawa Flying Column kept up skirmishes in Urewera from their base at Fort Galatea, to the west of the district. Finally, the Ngati Whare of Te Whaiti district, led by their chief Hapurona Kohi, surrendered at Galatea on 20 May as a result of the negotiating efforts of Corporal Te Meihana of Ngati Manawa. Cowan states that Tutakangahau of Maungapohatu surrendered with Ngati Whare.¹⁰⁰ Shortly afterwards, the Patuheuheu people of the Hormanga Gorge also surrendered. They offered as their reason that they were very badly disposed toward Te Kooti because so many of Tuhoe had died, and they greatly feared further war in their country.

To the south and east of the Tuhoe rohe, two Ngati Kahungunu contingents from Mohaka and Wairoa set out to reoccupy Onepoto at the end of April. Led by Hamlin (the resident magistrate at Wairoa), the Wairoa arm of the expedition occupied a position on the south of the lake, which they used as a base to attack and plunder pa on the northern shores of Waikaremoana. On 15 June, Te Makarini finally met Hamlin under a flag of truce, and a week later he surrendered, while expressing a great fear that his land would be taken away.¹⁰¹ Later, an Armed Constabulary unit

97. Ibid

98. Ibid, p 226

99. Ibid, p 223

100. Cowan, p 422

101. Binney, p 227

was stationed at Onepoto, remaining there until Te Kooti finally left Urewera in 1872.

Te Makarini and Hapurona Kohi were used by the Government to persuade the Ruatahuna chiefs to ‘come in’. On 11 July, Hapurona and other Tuhoe, including Rakuraku, who had also recently surrendered, went to Ruatahuna to convince Te Whenuanui and Paerau to surrender.¹⁰² All the people of Waikaremoana and Ruatahuna gathered at Tatahoata Pa, where they informed the Tuhoe intermediaries that Te Kooti was not with them and that they were willing to surrender, and even go out to the coast, but would not because they did not trust the Government. This was followed by a letter to the Government from the Ruatahuna chiefs, ‘Te Whenuanui and all Tuhoe Potiki’, on 16 July, in which they reiterated that they accepted the peace but would not ‘come in’.

On 17 June, Hira Te Popo and most of his hapu of Ngati Ira that remained, about 34 people, submitted at Opotiki.¹⁰³ Binney has noted the small numbers of these surrendering groups, underlining the odds that they faced against the colonial forces: ‘At the heart of the “resistance forces” were tiny hapu groups, who were usually no more than a few extended families’.¹⁰⁴

Rakuraku continued to play both sides of the conflict, on the one hand promising Te Keepa that he would ‘come in’ in March 1870, then fleeing with Te Kooti to Maraetahi, and then offering to shelter him at Tawhana. The Government forces were not above kidnapping Rakuraku’s wife in order to insure the chief made up his mind to surrender, which he did. He was then used, like Te Makarini and Hapurona, to induce the remaining Tuhoe chiefs to surrender.¹⁰⁵ On 27 July, all the inland hapu of Tuhoe met at Ruatahuna, where Hapurona and Rakuraku presented Tuhoe with the Government terms for their surrender. Tuhoe had to leave the land, abandon their arms, and go to the coast. By doing this, they would be spared and the Government would take no more land. The confiscation line, however, would remain where it was.¹⁰⁶ The chiefs were assured that they could surrender safely and that they would not be treated as criminals (as Te Kooti and Kereopa would be). Again, the Tuhoe response to this coercion was divided. Hapurona returned with some of Te Kooti’s followers who had surrendered, while remaining Tuhoe chiefs wrote a collective letter to the Government in August 1870. In it, they warned the Government to pursue Te Kooti outside of their boundaries but said they would notify the Government if Te Kooti showed up within their territory. They also wrote to Ngati Kahungunu saying that they would not permit Te Kooti within their rohe and that they regarded the peace made between Tamaikoha and Te Keepa as standing.¹⁰⁷ Hamlin obviously regarded Tuhoe’s position as relatively weak, and he replied that, if wanted to chase Te Kooti through Tuhoe lands, he would.

102. Ibid

103. Ibid, p 223

104. Ibid

105. Ibid, p 237

106. Ibid

107. Ibid, p 238

In late August, the Government sent Te Makarini back to Waikaremoana bearing the 'usual terms of peace'.¹⁰⁸ He was accompanied by Te Paea Iho, the sister of King Tawhiao. Tuhoe letters subsequent to this delegation made it clear that Te Kooti was not with Tuhoe, and that one of the reasons that many chiefs had not come in was because of a great sickness (probably influenza) that had killed perhaps 200 people and had confined others to their homes.

Tuhoe submissions regarding peace with the Government continued through the last months of 1870. At the end of September, all of Ngati Whare and Patuheuheu were reported to have come in. On 26 September, Te Whenuanui went to Whakatane and was followed by Paerau in October. Te Whenuanui sealed the peace with William Mair by exchanging gifts; he gave Mair two greenstone mere and coloured garments (signifying mana and tapu) while Mair gave the chief a watch, a gold ring and a cloak. Te Whenuanui asked for protection, as he believed he would now be killed by Te Kooti. In December 1870, Te Whenuanui, Paerau, Tutakangahau, and Te Makarini and their people went to Napier, where they formally made peace with J D Ormond. They were to remain there and be kept watch over by Te Moananui.¹⁰⁹ Binney states:

It was made clear that their return depended entirely upon Te Kooti's capture and their assistance in this matter. The Urewera was being stripped piecemeal of its people by forced evacuation and by disease. But the land could never be as empty as the Government wished.¹¹⁰

In October, Tamaikoha also met formally with Mair at Te Waimana, reaffirming his neutrality but making the terms of this position quite clear: Te Kooti could be pursued through his land, even to Maungapohatu, but Tamaikoha had to be kept informed of the troops' movements and none of his people nor his property were to be harmed. This seemed a more flexible offer than other Tuhoe chiefs were prepared to make – they would not sanction the chase for Te Kooti within their boundaries (for all the difference that this made). They were not sheltering Te Kooti per se, but it was obvious that they communicated with him, enabling him to remain undetected by the colonial forces that criss-crossed their country.¹¹¹

4.8 The Fourth Urewera Expedition, January 1871

January 1871 saw the commencement of what was known as the fourth Urewera expedition, the object of which was to target the epicentres of Tuhoe resistance at Ruatahuna and Maungapohatu. Gilbert Mair reached Ahikereru the same month, to discover that there were still Ngati Whare living there. They drew a flag of peace which Ngati Kahungunu had given them, and told Mair that Te Kooti was at Te

108. Ibid

109. Ibid, pp 240–241

110. Ibid, p 241

111. Ibid

Wera with about 20 men. According to Binney, Te Kooti was actually hiding in the land between Te Papuni and Ngatapa but he came to Maungapohatu in January, and found shelter with Ngati Huri, who had refused to go to the Coast the previous September and had dispersed.¹¹²

Ropata and Porter had again led the Ngati Porou contingent from Turanga, went up to Te Wera and then journeyed down the Waioeka River to Maraetahi, and continued to the Waimana valley, where they met Tamaikoha. Tamaikoha insisted upon escorting the invaders, lest he was accused of hiding Te Kooti. Tuhoe chiefs, meanwhile, had gathered at Tamaikoha's residence of Tauwharemanuka and communicated that they would not help hunt Te Kooti but would remain neutral. They told Ropata that Tuhoe did not consider Te Kooti a criminal because it was the duty of every Maori to fight the foreigner as the country was slipping from Maori control. Further, they commented that the killing of women and children, which was often held up by the colonists as typical of Te Kooti's murderous nature, was par for the course in wartime.¹¹³

The Maungapohatu people had not come to Tauwharemanuka and remained defiant. Kereru Te Pukenui (of Ngati Rongo with close ties to Maungapohatu) wrote to Tamaikoha and Ropata Wahawaha saying that no booted feet were to pass on Maungapohatu. A second letter arrived on 14 February from Maungapohatu saying that if Ropata and his 200 men approached them, the people would simply run away.¹¹⁴ This they did when Ropata occupied the old pa of Tauaki at Maungapohatu on 16 February. Ngati Huri retreated to Te Kakari on the track to Ruatahuna but sent word to Ropata that they would talk to him. Ropata and Porter met Ngati Huri whose speaker on this occasion was Te Purewa. The chief told them that Te Kooti was not with him and asked that Te Kooti be spared and peace be made. Te Purewa offered to guide them to Ruatahuna and there he would leave them, seeing as that was not his tribal domain – here, Te Purewa pointedly upheld the mana and authority that every Tuhoe chief expected to hold within his own district. Binney says that Te Purewa was deliberately ambiguous and Ropata later learned that Te Purewa had led them in the wrong direction, and that Ngati Huri were still in direct communication with Te Kooti, who had known the troops' movements as soon as they had entered the Waimana valley.¹¹⁵

Ropata and Porter had managed to capture some of Te Kooti's supporters as they combed the Urewera but frustration was running high as they failed, again, to capture their main prey. Te Whenuanui and Paerau were dispatched again to entreat Ngati Huri to either yield Te Kooti or submit immediately.¹¹⁶ This time, Tuhoe had the threat of the occupation of Ruatahuna and Maungapohatu by Ropata's men, hanging over their heads. It was made explicit that any pa which protected Te Kooti would be destroyed and its people taken away. The Tuhoe who remained in exile as

112. Ibid, pp 241–242

113. Ibid, p 242

114. Ibid, pp 242–243

115. Ibid, p 244

116. Ibid, p 247

the hunt continued, could only return if the Tuhoe who stayed in the mountains assisted the Government to find Te Kooti. At a hui in early April 1871 at Tatahoata, Tuhoe agreed again not to shelter Te Kooti but this time, they gained the reluctant agreement of Kereru Te Pukenui. He wrote to the Government:

This is my word to you. In the day of Ropata Te Kooti will have no men; they will all come over to the Government, the Ngatihuri and Ngatirongo. Te Kooti is now by himself (or at a distant place). I am now living in quietness . . .

This is another word to you. Some of my people are with Te Kooti. I did not tell them to go but he caught them . . . I will go to fetch them – I shall be strong to send them back.¹¹⁷

Hapurona, returning from this hui, was able to tell Preece that Te Kooti was believed to be at Mautaketake on the south eastern shores of Waikaremoana, with about 40 survivors. Preece and Gilbert Mair set out again from Fort Galatea on 25 May with 118 men, proceeding to Tatahoata where they met Te Whenuanui and Paerau. Another runanga was held on 1 and 2 June, where the Tuhoe chiefs again refused to help catch Te Kooti, ostensibly because they had been at war for some years and were tired of fighting. Ngati Huri followed this meeting with a runanga of their own on 20 June at Tauaki Pa. Te Purewa and Te Puehu plainly told Preece and Mair to turn back to Galatea because Te Kooti was not with them. Notable by his absence was Kereru Te Pukenui who withdrew from Maungapohatu upon the approach of Preece and Mair, it being common knowledge now that he and Ngati Huri had assisted Te Kooti and lied about it.¹¹⁸ This was the situation that would obtain through most of 1871. Binney reports that Tuhoe were exhausted and starving at this time, but still helped Te Kooti with the only means at their disposal:

There was clearly a covert assistance for Te Kooti, even though few now actually wished to fight along with him. The odds for victory through war were impossible. But the sympathy for his autonomous stand was extensive . . . The delivery of muddled information, mingled with deliberately confused reports and slanderous assertions, was turned into an art form by Tuhoe.¹¹⁹

Through the harsh winter, Te Kooti sheltered east of Lake Waikaremoana. He captured some of Te Makarini's people, posted by the chief to keep an eye on Te Kooti at the lake. Kereru Te Pukenui requested that they be released, but Te Kooti refused. Preece and Mair picked up Te Kooti's trail and lost it again innumerable times throughout this period, and there were frustratingly close shaves with Te Kooti himself – but still he remained at large.

It was in the latter stages of 1871 that some Tuhoe joined the Government's hunt for Te Kooti. Tamaikoha joined Preece and Mair in an expedition in early October. Another Tuhoe expedition led by Hemi Kakitu, who had formerly joined with Te Kooti at Whakarae, attacked his camp near Ahikereru with a small force of Te

117. Kereru Te Pukenui to H T Clarke, 10 April 1871, AJHR, 1871, f-1, p 23 (cited in Binney, p 248)

118. Binney, p 248

119. Ibid, pp 248–249

Whenuanui's and Tamaikoha's men. These leaders had to assist the colonial forces as the price set for their peace with the Government; moreover, they had been 'brought to their knees' by starvation. Te Whiu Maraki was another of Te Kooti's ex-followers who was forced to help the Government troops. In August 1872, he led a detachment of troops to a small village called Roau, in the upper reaches of the Whakatane River, where Kereopa Te Rau was finally captured.¹²⁰

4.9 Tuhoe's Accord with Mclean, 1871

Because Ngati Huri had refused to actively help the Government, and had instead been tacitly supporting Te Kooti, Ropata's forces attacked Maungapohatu in late October 1871. Tauaki and Te Kakari were both attacked and captured as part of the 'pacification' of Ngati Huri. Maungapohatu and Ruatahuna were then occupied by Ropata's force, and he built a redoubt at Maungapohatu called Kohitau, or 'gather in the years', a reference to the time taken to conquer Tuhoe.¹²¹ Te Makarini wrote to the Government bitterly complaining of Ropata burning Tuhoe homes, destroying their cultivations, and killing people. Te Purewa protested the same actions, declaring that the authority within Maungapohatu was his:

He would have nothing to do with Ruatahuna: let Te Whenuanui and Paerau manage their people, and Tamaikoha his. Theirs was not the authority in Maungapohatu: the management of each hapu was its own.¹²²

Te Purewa's statement underlined the independence of each of the Tuhoe chiefs, and the separate mana they held over land and people. It was this status that the chiefs wished McLean to respect and acknowledge, if he was to receive any assistance from them. It appears that several Tuhoe chiefs including Te Whenuanui and Paerau personally visited Donald McLean in Wellington in 1871, where the capitulation of Tuhoe, and of Ngati Huri in particular, was negotiated.¹²³ The terms of this agreement, as reported by Binney, were extremely important for Tuhoe because McLean agreed to a regional autonomy for the Urewera, and to recognise each chief as having the authority within his own district.¹²⁴ Tuhoe were to cling to this promise in the ensuing years, as the Government strove to forget that it had been made. However, at the time, Ormond reported the deal as such to Porter: 'The Chiefs given direction of affairs in their own districts on condition Te Kooti given up to the Law'.¹²⁵ This was expressly communicated to Tuhoe chiefs as well; on 20

120. Ibid, p 266; Sissons, p 138

121. Binney, pp 264–265

122. Te Purewa to Ormond, not dated (November 1871), agg-hb2/1, NA (cited in Binney, p 266)

123. Judith Binney notes that Ormond's letter to Te Makarini, dated 20 November 1871 (cited on the following page) suggests that Te Whenuanui and Paerau agreed to the wider terms of their peace with the Government when in Wellington, prior to their return to Urewera in April 1871: Binney to the author, personal communication, 12 February 1999.

124. Binney, p 266; Binney, 'Te Mana Tuatoru: The Rohe Potae of Tuhoe', *New Zealand Journal of History*, vol 31, no 1, April 1997, p 117

November 1871, J D Ormond, agent for the general Government in Hawke's Bay, wrote to Tamaikoha:

Friend I received your letter written from Waimana and hear that Te Kooti's people are in your hands for safe keeping. That is well[,] it is to you that the Govt now look to prevent them from returning again to evil – Also it is to you the regulation of aairs within your boundaries will be entrusted, to Whenuanui and Paerau in their boundaries and to Purewa in his. As for Te Kooti, I have written to Whenuanui and Paerau he must be given up to the law as it is within their boundaries he is now hiding. Friend add your word that the evil caused by this man may be ended.¹²⁶

To Te Purewa, he wrote:

The Govt have considered your proposal to leave the management of your people in your hands[;] that is to look to you to keep evil out of your boundaries and hold your people together. This word of yours is accepted and it is to you the Government will look in future for the regulation of aairs at Maungapohatu. What is wanted is that goodwill shall exist between your people and the Govt and that Te Kooti and other evil disposed [sic] people shall be given up. Porter will talk with you about the [employment?] of you and your people to carry mail so that communication between us may be complete.¹²⁷

To Te Makarini, he wrote:

Friend I have received your letters through Major Cumming [?] and have been glad to and that your people have been kept together and out of evil. Capt Porter will give you what word there is of here and it will be for you to add your word to Whenuanui and Paerau that Te Kooti who is within their boundaries be given up to the law in accordance with their promise to me at [Wellington?]. Another word of mine is that you talk with your people about a road for Waikaremoana and Wairoa and from Waikaremoana to Ruatahuna so that the mail may go – write to me on this and the roadwork shall be given to your people that they may earn money as is done by the other tribes.¹²⁸

To Whenuanui and Paerau, Ormond wrote:

Friends, when you left here your agreement with me was you were to keep your boundaries clear of trouble and that if Te Kooti came within your boundaries he was to be given up by you. The Govt are well informed of what has happened since. Quite recently an oäer was made by Wepiha that Te Kooti would be given up by you and he [cojointly?] to be tried by the law provided the Govt withdraw Ngatiporou from your boundaries. Wepiha is now employed on that business. It rests now with yourselves. Te Kooti *is in* your boundaries[;] it is for you to fuläll your agreement and

125. Ormond to Porter, annotation dated 21 November 1871 on Porter to Ormond, 16 November 1871, agg-hb13, NA (cited in Binney, 'Te Mana Tuatoru', p 117)

126. Ormond to Tamaikoha, 20 November 1871, agg-hb4/8, NA. The author thanks Vincent O'Malley for änding and sharing this information.

127. Ormond to Te Purewa, Maungapohatu, 20 November 1871, agg-hb4/8, NA

128. Ormond to Te Makarini, Waikaremoana, 20 November 1871, agg-hb4/8, NA

hand him over to the law – let that be done at once. You choose to whom [you] will give him either to Major Cumming at Waikaremoana or to Mr Clarke at Tauranga or to Major Ropata. Ngatiporou will then withdraw at once and the management of your people will be left to be managed by yourselves. Porter will talk with you and arrange about the mail through which communication will be kept up between us. The Govt relies on your word being kept. [Emphasis in original.]¹²⁹

Ormond sent the letters ahead to Ropata at Maungapohatu, so he could read the agreements reached with the Tuhoe chiefs. Ormond expressed hope that the Urewera chiefs would give Te Kooti up, in spite of hearing rumours that the Waikato oāered Te Kooti sanctuary, but he cautioned: ‘if not we must determine what course to take towards them [Tuhoe] and I shall be glad of your advice on this point after you have seen what they have to say to my letters’.¹³⁰ After hearing of Kereopa’s capture, Ormond again wrote to Major Ropata, congratulating him. He added that he thought it likely that Tuhoe might act upon his letters and give up Te Kooti:

but this will be more likely if you are there to push them. I meant those letters to be more a lever for you to use than anything else. I would like therefore you to return to Ruatahuna at once and push matters. Your having caught Kereopa will assist I think in causing the Urewera to hand over [Te] Kooti – at any rate you will not be very long delayed and the Govt would then like you to visit Wellington and receive their congratulations.¹³¹

Having secured an agreement that recognised their authority in their own land, the Maungapohatu chiefs joined the search for Te Kooti. Hetaraka Te Wakaunua of Maungapohatu led an expedition as far as Te Papuni and Erepeti in late February 1872 and joined Ferris at Lake Waikaremoana in March. On this last excursion, there were 18 men from Maungapohatu and āve from Tikitiki participating in the search.

From October 1871 to March 1872, Te Kooti traversed the country between the Urewera and the upper Wairoa and Mohaka Forests. He then passed back through Heruiwi, crossed the Rangitaiki River and the Kaingaroa Plains, forded the Waikato and entered Arowhenua, and safety, on 15 May 1872.

For Tuhoe, then, the war was over. They had, they believed, McLean’s agreement that they were to look after their own āāairs within their rohe – the ‘peace’ that existed between Tuhoe and the Government was more in the nature of an uneasy truce and had been a pragmatic response to the depradations that the Government had inīcted upon them for their support of Te Kooti.

129. Ormond to Whenuanui and Paerau, 20 November 1871, agg-hb4/8, NA

130. Ormond to Ropata Wahawaha, 21 November 1871, agg-hb4/8, NA

131. Ormond to Ropata Wahawaha, 24 November 1871, agg-hb4/8, NA

4.10 Conclusion

Melbourne has said that the forced removal of Tuhoe chiefs from Puketū, and their detainment at Whakatane, in September 1867, marked the end of any Tuhoe cooperation with Government authorities. Yet, it seems that neither did this signal complete Tuhoe commitment to war. A hui at Ruatahuna, in early 1868, failed to reach a decision on the course of action that Tuhoe, as a tribe, should adopt. Some Tuhoe leaders wanted to take immediate military action but at the same time, we see a significant number of chiefs who wanted to hold back, to maintain a neutral position and act defensively. Te Whenuanui (of the Te Urewera and Ngati Rongo hapu) counselled this course, and we have seen that this was the position he originally took when Tuhoe discussed going to Orakau in 1864. He, however, had changed his mind on that occasion and fought in the Waikato, and it is known that he also fought at Te Kopane in January 1866 and possibly at Te Tapiri in the same year. Fighting Government forces in the heart of the Tuhoe rohe, however, was probably felt to be a far more damaging undertaking as far as his people were concerned. In early 1868, too, the chief Paerau wanted to try and negotiate a peace with the Government, even though he was not supported by his own people on the matter. These two chiefs, and Hapurona Kohi of Te Whaiti, emerge in the narratives of the wars as perhaps being more 'moderate' than other Tuhoe leaders. None the less, Te Whenuanui and Paerau had both been Pai Marire followers and were also among the Tuhoe chiefs who committed themselves and their lands to Te Kooti at Tawhana in March 1869. Te Kooti offered Tuhoe moral support, spiritual leadership, and the hope of restitution of confiscated land, and this was more important still since Tuhoe could not hope for support from Waikato, even though the Kingitanga had encouraged Tuhoe mobilisation against the Government.

The undertaking at Tawhana bound Tuhoe to the fortunes of Te Kooti and they paid dearly for their support of a man seen as the primary enemy of the Pakeha. The Government forces conducted a ruthless scorched earth campaign in their invasions of the Urewera, destroying food stores, crops, livestock, and houses, in an effort to break the network that sustained Te Kooti. Many Tuhoe starved and suffered from lack of shelter; they told Mair that for years, they had 'lived in caves and holes in the ground' and desperately needed to plant food and build houses.¹³² Tuhoe would later say that they had lost 160 men in the various engagements of the wars, but even this was not a reflection of the numbers of Tuhoe, including women and children, who would have starved in the winters of 1870–71. Temara says the population 'dwindled' as a result of the invasions.¹³³

Te Whenuanui indicated as early as January 1870 that he wanted to negotiate a peace with the Government but the terms of a peace – leaving the Urewera en masse to be held on Government reserves – were unpalatable at the time. Tamaikoha, however, concluded a peace with Te Keepa of Whanganui, in March

132. G Mair to officer commanding Tauranga district, 11 July 1871, AJHR, 1871, f-1, p 43; see also Ormond to Colonial Secretary, 23 May 1870, AJHR, 1870, a-8b, p 67

133. Temara, p 529

1870. Tamaikoha had never supported Te Kooti and seemed to function quite independently of other Tuhoe chiefs, yet he only offered Te Keepa his neutrality and did not, at this point, assist in the search for Te Kooti. Tamaikoha was never attacked again, and while the peace was intended by Te Keepa as extending to all of Tuhoe, the Government forces kept up attacks in the Urewera, as it was clear that the people covertly assisted Nga Morehu (Te Kooti and his few survivors).

Finally, and perhaps inevitably, Tuhoe were forced to surrender. In May 1870, Hapurona led Ngati Whare to surrender at Galatea, and Patuheuheu submitted shortly thereafter. In September, Te Whenuanui met Mair at Ruatoki and pledged peace, which was sealed with an exchange of gifts. In December 1870, he, Paerau, Tutakangahau, Te Makarini and others, formally made peace with the Superintendent of Hawke's Bay, J D Ormond, in Napier. Tuhoe chiefs sent a delegation, which included Paerau, to Wellington in early 1871, where they apparently met with Donald McLean. Binney says that the terms of the capitulation of Tuhoe, including Ngati Huri, were negotiated on this occasion. McLean promised the Tuhoe chiefs the regulation of affairs within their boundaries, but they had to give up Te Kooti to the law.

In spite of increasing pressure on Tuhoe to either surrender Te Kooti or assist in his capture, he remained undetected in the wilderness of Te Urewera. Ngati Huri and Ngati Rongo were epicentres of resistance against the Government, and their chiefs defiantly refused to submit. Kereru Te Pukenui was described by Preece as 'the most hostile chief in the Urewera', and Mair described Te Puehu as having an ingrained hatred of the Pakeha. There was a suggestion, by Captain Porter, that 'a feeling of jealousy' existed between Kereru and remaining unsundered chiefs, and Paerau and Te Whenuanui, over who had the authority to make peace on their behalf. Surrendered or not, many of the Tuhoe chiefs, however, still refused to take part in the hunt for Te Kooti, telling the Government that they were tired of fighting. Those that did escort invading troops were suspected of leading them in the wrong direction.

Ropata's forces attacked Maungapohatu in late October 1871, in an attempt to 'pacify' Ngati Huri and shatter the Tuhoe resistance. Tuhoe chiefs evidently felt that McLean's acknowledgement of their authority afforded them some protection, and they upheld their side of the bargain by joining in the search for Te Kooti. He was not captured, and eventually escaped to the Rohe Potae in May 1872.

McLean, then, sought to pacify Tuhoe by making the significant concession of recognising their chiefy autonomy and mana over their land. The Government was sick of the conquests and of the wars, which were demoralising as well as expensive, and probably realised that it did not have the military ability to occupy and hold the district indefinitely anyway. Further, the Urewera district was not immediately required for settlement. What remained to be confirmed with Tuhoe, however, were the boundaries over which Tuhoe authority was to be exercised. Sources consulted do not indicate whether this issue was negotiated or even aired by Paerau and McLean at Napier, but now the war was at an end, the matter of Government and Tuhoe perceptions of where those boundaries lay would become